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The Venezuelan Diaspora: A Cerebral Exodus 
 For decades, Venezuela remained a destination for immigrants from all over Latin 
America and Spain. Refugees from both Pinochet and Franco’s regimes sought asylum in the 
country, and Venezuela took advantage of its escalating labor supply by consolidating workers 
into its petroleum market. This rich market gave way to even more immigration from Latin 
America. However, the past two decades have seen the absolute reverse of this pattern as 1.2-1.6 
million Venezuelans have left the country, representing about six percent of the entire 
Venezuelan population (Páez). Though Venezuelans’ reasons for migration vary, as many of 
them cite violence, political instability, or economic difficulties as their impetus to leave, the 
effects on the country have been largely economic and pose an even bigger threat twenty years 
down the road. This surge in emigration also poses humanitarian threats as migrants are forced 
into dangerous situations crossing closed borders. The current phase of the Venezuelan diaspora 
hinges on the evolution of a culture of uncertainty, in which multiple factors, such as the 
crumbling economy and increasing crime rates, contribute to the general anxiety the public feels. 
I will first examine the nature of the phenomenon of “brain drain” and the ways in which it poses 
a threat to Venezuela. Then, I will consider emigrants’ reasons for leaving the country, bearing in 
mind the principal theme of Venezuelan disquietude. Finally, I will explore possible remedies to 
the human capital crisis that the country is experiencing.  
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 The steady trickle of citizens leaving the Venezuelan borders is a symptom of the current 
economic woes of the country. On account of binding price controls and spiraling inflation rates, 
one economist has found that Venezuela currently ranks first on the “misery index,” a metric that 
compares government favorability polls and an aggregate measurement of inflation and 
unemployment minus GDP (Hanke). The dire economic circumstances have been the impetus for 
six percent of the country’s population leaving—between 1.2 and 1.5 million people over the 
past two decades (Paéz). However, the worrying part of these numbers lies in the demographics 
of who is emigrating. One study found that 25- to 34-year-olds make up 33.5 percent of the 
emigrants (Loginow), which creates problems for economies because of the loss of an energetic 
work force. Economic development relies on robust populations that are willing to work, so the 
depletion of Venezuela’s young people could signal future economic troubles. But the loss of 
this demographic poses a threat mostly to the older populations in the future—those above 50—
because as they look to retire, they will find substantial portions of the working economy unable 
to support their retirement (Loginow).  
Another challenge for these older generations will come from the substantial and 
alarming loss of medical professionals within the country, especially as these generations age to 
the point where they require constant medical support. Quite simply, older people require 
significantly more medical attention. However, because of the increasing international demand 
for workers in the medical sector, 6.9% of the medical professionals registered with el ministerio 
del poder popular para la Salud, a public institution whose goal is to promote healthy practices 
through guaranteed access to health services, emigrated from the country between 2008 and 2009 
(Hernández). Although the increasing emigration is largely symptomatic of the worsening 
economy, these statistics predict the possibility of humanitarian crises related to health within the 
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next few decades. A country with a large elderly population and a scarcity of medical 
professionals will have to rely on foreign aid in order to provide this basic human right for its 
people. 
 Within the private sector, companies find themselves hurting as well, especially because 
of difficulty retaining young employees who seek better opportunities abroad. Not only do 
younger workers generally leap-frog from job to job in search of better economic opportunities, 
but private companies get hit with a one-two punch as they face increasing competition for 
laborers from other companies. Couple this increasing competition with high rates of inflation, 
employers find themselves at a loss as to what to do. While inflation has made basic living a 
struggle in terms of even supplying oneself with food and other necessary goods, salary averages 
hardly budged between 2000 and 2008 (Torres). The desire to leave the country is of course 
obvious because young workers face incredibly high opportunity costs if they decide to stay, 
foregoing the possibility of making a much easier living in another country. This phenomenon of 
“brain drain” consists of the loss of energetic, specialized workers, preventing the economy from 
growing. 
 But the largest humanitarian crisis comes from the sheer process of mass migration itself. 
As residents flood to border towns such as Cúcuta, Colombia, migrants account for up to 65 
percent of all hospital visits, and many patients treated suffer from sexually transmitted diseases 
with the arrival of prostitutes (Lopes). Health crises such as this are just one of many other 
crises. After Venezuela closed its Colombian border formally in 2015, migrants were forced to 
take riskier trips back and forth across the border to buy food, crossing streams and forests in the 
middle of the night to avoid security guards (Lopes). The plight of migrants is a universal issue, 
but when crossing borders becomes increasingly more difficult, migrants naturally resort to more 
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dangerous processes of reaching destinations. This poses an enormous humanitarian threat for 
the safety of migrants. 
 Past surges in immigration to Venezuela helped to forge the strong oil-based economy 
that dominated the world for so many years. However, with the complete reversal of this trend, 
the country faces problems both humanitarian and economic in nature. This trend of emigration 
is not a cause of underdevelopment, but rather a symptom. Regardless, it poses problems for 
future development, especially as the country attempts to fix the economic and political problems 
that trouble it. In other words, although brain drain historically was never a problem for 
Venezuela, it could launch the country back economically by decades and inhibit further 
development. 
 The causes of massive emigration are complex and numerous simply because migrants 
are not a monolithic demographic. Each person migrates for his or her own individual reasons. 
However, certain systemic problems in the country are easily identifiable and shed light on why 
bright, young Venezuelans are so eager to leave.  
A primary obstacle Venezuela faces currently is the lack of housing, and the general lack 
of reliable infrastructure. This is most evident in the city of Caracas, where informal settlements 
have been growing on the city’s periphery for years, expanding slowly onto the mountainsides, 
creating labyrinths of streets and makeshift houses. The essay “Squatter City” by Michael 
Eamonn Miller aptly demonstrates the lived experience of several people who are forced to build 
homes in informal settlements, and he portrays the feelings of anxiety many of these citizens 
feel, but what is more striking is the photo essay juxtaposed with Miller’s article. Photographer 
Alvaro Ybarra Zavala documents the chaotic nature of the housing problems, showing the urban 
sprawl slowly reaching its fingers over the mountainside as well as the intimidating height of 
 5 
high-rise slums (Miller). Not only does Caracas face the challenge of low-quality homes, but also 
it also simply lacks housing. The UN Habitat estimated in 2015 that Venezuela needs 2.5 million 
new homes, and this need is mostly concentrated in the capitol city (Miller 198). The issue of 
housing, of course, is augmented by the city’s crumbling infrastructure. Informal settlements 
have to resort to stealing electricity and siphoning water from larger pipelines, and roads and 
bridges are often in states of disrepair (Miller 200). To put it bluntly, the low-quality 
infrastructure of this growing city makes life simply inconvenient in the city, providing little 
incentive for young workers to stay, and the lack of access to housing does not help the matter 
either. Uncertainty regarding housing and infrastructure is at its core an uncertainty regarding the 
most fundamental parts of life, creating a shared cultural anxiety that drives young Venezuelans 
out of the country. 
 On top of housing insecurities, young Venezuelans face myriad economic obstacles in 
their path to unemployment as well. Much of this can be traced to the country’s severe 
dependence on oil exports as its primary source of GDP. Although only one percent of the 
Venezuelan labor force in 1997 was employed in the extractive industries, their revenue 
accounted for approximately 23 percent of the country’s GDP (Jonakin 1291). Despite the high 
level of skill required for mining and petroleum operations, both industries experience the same 
struggles as many resource economies: not only are prices dependent on the global market’s 
capricious demands for primary resources, but also the industries do not promote the 
development of other complementary industries. The trend of neoliberal foreign direct 
investment may have increased the GDP of the nation, but it failed to create stable job markets 
that could pose long-term labor opportunities in Venezuela.  
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 The most recent decade has seen similarly dismaying job prospects, especially for young 
people, contributing to the exodus of young workers. The years 2013-2015 experienced 
significant decay in the GDP for virtually all industries, including construction, manufacturing, 
transportation, services, and mining (Palmo 13). Young, educated Venezuelans face a difficult 
choice: stay in Venezuela, where job prospects are low even for people with high levels of 
formal education, or move to another country in Latin America and find economic stability. The 
economic insecurity Venezuelans face is likely the most salient reason for the country’s brain 
drain, as young people face enormous uncertainties regarding their careers, especially when they 
consider the country’s future economic projections. 
 The Venezuelan diaspora is also largely driven by crime, which contributes to the culture 
of fear in a different way than economic uncertainty does. Fear of death, the most primal fear 
among human, a fear that has inspired belabored existential writings for centuries, threatens the 
very livelihood of a person, and Venezuela’s ever-increasing crime rate does little to pacify the 
masses. The United States Department of State reports that in 2012, Venezuela had 72 deaths per 
100,000 people, ranking its murder rate as one of the top five in the world (Venezuela Country). 
Venezuelan sociologist Roberto Briceño-León organizes Venezuelan violence into three phases. 
The first phase, which he calls “institutional crisis,” lasted from 1989-1993, which represented a 
break in the social pact against violence (Briceño-León 15). In this phase, Briceño-León argues 
that violence was legitimized as a political tool to achieve goals, culminating in a murder rate of 
21 per 100,000 by the end of 1993 (15). The second phase from 1994-1998, was characterized by 
the stabilization of the homicide rate, as president Rafael Caldera made long strides to restore 
faith in the institution (16). The final phase, which he calls “institutional destruction,” began in 
1999 and continues to this day, marked by an incrementally increasing murder rate and further 
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legitimization of violence as a political tool (17). Rather than viewing violence as merely a 
product of the increase in poverty, Briceño-León emphasizes the systematic aspect of the 
increase in violence. The cultural acceptance of violence relates directly to a culture of fear, one 
in which one’s very own safety is not guaranteed. Faced with mounting anxiety about murder, 
young Venezuelans choose to leave because of the daily threat of violence. Violence has, in a 
way, become normalized in the country, such that some justify violence to accomplish their own 
personal goals now. 
 Of course, the precarious financial position Venezuela finds itself in limits its options of 
fixing the problem, especially as the national debt continues to skyrocket. The country has spent 
most of its efforts to control rising prices and a growing debt and has not been able to 
concentrate on retaining its intellectual workers. However, a focus on putting a plug on the drain 
of human capital from the country would address a symptom of Venezuela’s problems and 
would likely not lead to long-lasting economic growth. What I therefore propose is a life-gives-
you-lemons approach to Venezuela’s brain drain, which is strongly grounded both theoretically 
and tangibly. The country must take advantage of its fiscal situation to look ahead and make 
investments that could boost growth years down the road. This approach seeks to exploit both the 
high numbers of Venezuelans living abroad as well as the low costs of skilled labor within the 
country. 
 As the depletion of intellectual personnel is a problem not just limited to Venezuela, 
economists have written extensively on it in order to find remedies. Current literature tends to 
center itself on the positive effects of brain drain on an economy (such as remittances sent from 
developed nations that convert rather lucratively to local currency), but economist Jagdish 
Bhagwati proposed a controversial idea in 1972 that looked to capitalize on emigrating 
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demographics through taxation. Through two edited volumes of his idea, Bhagwati explores the 
effect of emigration on tax policy, arguing that taxes on professionals living abroad could 
substantially increase a country’s revenue (Wilson 2). Of note is his argument that not taxing 
citizens abroad leads to a “representation without taxation” (3) because citizens retain their legal 
rights under the government, such as the right to vote (3). Why should a professional who has 
immigrated to another country receive the same rights as a loyal citizen, despite not paying any 
taxes at all? This brain-drain tax also acts as an incentive for some professionals to stay in the 
country if they fear being doubly taxed both in their country of origin as well as their home 
country. While John Douglas Wilson, an economics professor at Michigan State University, 
argues that a certain level of cooperation between host governments and developing-country 
governments may eventually be necessary in order to avoid this double taxation, what could be 
most effective immediately for Venezuela is a low tax rate applicable to all Venezuelans working 
abroad immediately, which could help give the country a boost during these trying times (9).  
 Critics of Bhagwati’s proposal point out the serious flaws in emigration taxes, which 
could prevent the tax from being applied to Venezuelans abroad. Primarily, a tax like this would 
come as a bureaucratic nightmare to the country because it would require the taxes to go through 
a neutral party—namely, the UN. The development of formal taxation processes would cost 
millions for an already swamped government that is trying to suppress ballooning prices. This is 
a legitimate critique of the plan; however, its efficacy may be more likely down the road as the 
country (hopefully) halts the growing inflation. For this reason, an emigration tax may be a 
stronger policy option after the country picks itself up again.  
 The life-and lemons approach is more applicable in terms of the technology industry, 
which has seen a surprising amount of growth despite Venezuela’s tough economic climate for 
 9 
startups. Tech companies have found a sort of wage haven in which desperate employees are 
willing to take software development jobs for relatively low wages as opposed to emigrating. 
These fields could prevent the exodus of hundreds of thousands of valuable young people. But 
the government’s incapability of providing investments to this field has created an investment 
vacuum that one independent company has filled: Wayra. This Caracas-based startup-
acceleration company has provided funding for 31 technology-based projects since 2012, 
filtering applications from a wide pool of 1,849 projects and accepting only 1.29% of applicants 
(Wayra). Of note are startups such as Pollito, which has created a social networking site for 
mothers to exchange used baby toys; Singular, an augmented reality platform that designs 
interactive programming for clients; and DLN, a website whose purpose is to teach English to 
Venezuelans in a more compelling way by featuring completely nude teachers (Wayra). 
Companies such as Wayra offer a sliver of hope to a country with a draining source of human 
capital by promoting the tech industry in a tech-driven world. Advertisements to foreign 
investors are therefore crucial. With inflation rates so high, a US dollar will go significantly 
further in Venezuela than it will in the US in terms of labor costs, so Wayra and similar 
companies must begin to advertise their firm and its capabilities to an international audience in 
order to provide water to this flowering industry.  
 The Bolivarian Revolution certainly indicated the Venezuelan government’s 
understanding of the importance of technological training, so the process of creating a strong 
technological industry has been in the works for years. Ideologically, the Revolution sought to 
create a social economy that would work for all people by closing economic gaps between social 
classes, as opposed to the capitalist system that pits competing interests against each other and 
widens gaps between classes (Haydee et al., 36). From this search for a social economy came the 
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development of technological information centers across the country, featuring high-quality 
computers as well as informal training on basic computer processes (41). These centers in theory 
work to decrease the technology gap between the rich and poor by offering the less economically 
advantaged populations a chance to learn skills they would need in most job markets and 
subsequently develop the technology industry. Though this policy was not originally created to 
retain young workers in the country, it acted as one of the first steps in fostering the technology 
industry by giving more people the opportunity to enter the sector. However, over the next few 
years, the ever-increasing inflation may act as a strong impediment to whatever progress these 
centers make.  
 The Venezuelan diaspora has uprooted over a million people, a process that has changed 
the country from a nation of immigrants into a nation of emigrants. Amidst political, social, and 
economic tensions, young Venezuelans find it difficult to remain in the country, so they opt to 
relocate themselves abroad, carrying with them invaluable intellectual resources that deepen the 
economic crisis of the country. A whole host of problems arises from this, but most prominent 
are the economic and humanitarian issues that threaten the lives of Venezuelans today. Hope is 
fleeting, too, as efforts to incentivize young workers to stay will likely yield little results. What is 
needed in Venezuela can perhaps not be attained through policies or investments. Instead, greater 
support for migrant networks, medical centers, and an economic bailout would help to ease the 
suffering of these people as they go through turmoil. Or, perhaps Maduro needs to step down and 
hand over the reigns.  
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Other paragraphs: Investments in the tech industry. Define Bolivarian economy—how does this 
relate to FDI? Argue that Venezuela should encourage tech startups because it is a growing field, 
and an emphasis on that part of the economy will drive more people to study that and become 
software engineers.  
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